Two decades ago, before I became a journalist, I used to work as a social anthropologist in the Himalayas. It is undoubtedly an unusual background for a financial journalist. 

    Indeed, whenever I reveal my strange past today, bankers usually either react with horror (what does she know about finance?) or incredulity (why would anyone spend years studying Tajik goat-herders?)

    But a decade later, my years in Tajikistan are suddenly starting to look a whole lot more useful. For one thing that anthropology imparts is a healthy respect for the importance of micro-level incentives and political structures. And right now these issues are becoming critically important for Wall Street and the City, as the credit crunch deepens by the day. 

    Take the matter of risk and remuneration at banks. As my colleague, Martin Wolf, pointed out this week, one reason for the recent excesses of the credit bubble lies in how bankers are paid. For the emphasis on annual bonuses creates crazy incentives for bankers to gamble with client money – particularly since they don't pay back these bonuses if deals later sour.

    However, what is equally interesting is while this bonus system is endemic, it has not produced identical outcomes at the banks. Some (such as JPMorgan and Deutsche) appeared to have ducked the worst of the credit pain, while others (Goldman Sachs) have thrived. However, banks such as Citi, UBS and Merrill are producing mind-boggling losses. 

    Why? Luck, undoubtedly, plays a part. But I suspect at least three other factors might also shed light on the puzzle.

    One is obvious: namely the character of those running banks. In recent years, it has been fashionable in management circles to encourage leaders to delegate. This is a principle Chuck Prince, former head of Citi, for example, appears to have practised (perhaps because there was no alternative, given Citi's gargantuan size). So, famously, did James Cayne at Bear Stearns.

    But one trait most surviving bank leaders share, as one policymaker recently observed to me, is that “they tend to be meddlers – very hands on”. Moreover, many also have another key feature: they have had direct career experience of trading and managing market risk. This has given them an obvious advantage in navigating the credit cycle, since they presumably know what a derivative is.

    Furthermore, men such as Lloyd Blankfein at Goldman Sachs or Anshu Jain at Deutsche, who have risen through trading desks, instinctively tend to view everything in terms of probabilities and risk. That is a different mindset from somebody who has previously worked as a salesman, adviser – or lawyer, such as Mr Prince.

    However, there is a third issue which may be even more important – the culture of power. As far an outsider can tell, Goldman Sachs appears to have retained many of the cultural features of its previous partnership. Employees typically view themselves as being affiliated to the bank, not business line, and there is a strong ethos of shared accountability. As a result, senior Goldman staff appear able to scrutinise the operations of other business units with more freedom than at other banks.

    However, groups such as Citi or Merrill appear to have developed a more hierarchical pattern, in which the different business lines have existed like warring tribes, answerable only to the chief. Moreover, the most profitable tribe has invariably wielded the most power – and thus was untouchable and inscrutable to everyone else. Hence the fact that, in this tribal culture, nobody reined in the excesses of the structured finance teams at Citi and Merrill.

    Now, I fully expect that my e-mail box tomorrow will be full of e-mails from bankers, complaining this three-point account is a gross simplification. No doubt. But what is crystal clear is that if you want to understand which banks will emerge as winners from the current mess, it is no longer enough to look at their computer systems and balance sheets. Now, more than ever, investors need to understand a bank's culture too – and the degree to which it is tribal. As I said, a training in Tajik anthropology is suddenly looking very useful.

    二十年前，當(dāng)我還沒(méi)有進(jìn)入記者行業(yè)的時(shí)候，我曾經(jīng)作為一名社會(huì)人類(lèi)學(xué)者，在喜馬拉雅地區(qū)工作過(guò)一段時(shí)間。對(duì)于一名金融記者而言，這無(wú)疑是一種與眾不同的背景。

    的確，無(wú)論我什么時(shí)候講述到那段特別的過(guò)往歲月，銀行人士通常要么是一幅驚駭表情（她對(duì)金融能有什么了解啊？），要么就是一臉的難以置信（怎么還有人想去研究塔吉克牧羊人？）

    但在十年之后，我的塔吉克斯坦經(jīng)歷突然開(kāi)始變得有用起來(lái)了。因?yàn)槿祟?lèi)學(xué)教會(huì)我的一件事，就是正確認(rèn)識(shí)微觀層面激勵(lì)和政治架構(gòu)的重要性。目前，對(duì)于華爾街與金融城而言，隨著信貸緊縮日益加深，這些問(wèn)題逐漸變得至關(guān)重要。

    以銀行的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與薪酬問(wèn)題為例。正如我的同事馬丁•沃爾夫(Martin Wolf)最近所指出的，最近信貸泡沫肆虐的原因之一，就在于銀行人士的薪酬方式。對(duì)年終獎(jiǎng)金的重視極大地刺激了銀行人士，鼓勵(lì)他們用客戶的資金進(jìn)行博弈——尤其是即便這些交易隨后出現(xiàn)問(wèn)題，他們也不必交回獎(jiǎng)金。

    然而，同樣很有意思的是，雖然這個(gè)獎(jiǎng)金制度是該行業(yè)的通病，但各家銀行的命運(yùn)并不一樣。一些銀行——如摩根大通(JPMorgan)與德意志銀行(Deutsche)——似乎躲過(guò)了最嚴(yán)重的信貸危機(jī)打擊，而高盛(Goldman Sachs)等銀行更是繁榮依舊。然而，花旗(Citi)、瑞銀(UBS)及美林( Merrill)等銀行損失慘重。

    為什么？無(wú)疑，這里有運(yùn)氣的成分。但我懷疑，至少還有其它三個(gè)因素，會(huì)對(duì)我們解開(kāi)這一謎題有所助益。

    其一很明顯：那些銀行掌門(mén)人的性格。近些年，在管理圈中，鼓勵(lì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人放權(quán)已經(jīng)成為時(shí)尚。這似乎是花旗前首席執(zhí)行官查克•普林斯(Chuck Prince)曾經(jīng)秉持的一個(gè)原則（考慮到花旗的巨大規(guī)模，這也可能是因?yàn)樗麆e無(wú)選擇）。貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)的詹姆斯•凱恩(James Cayne)也是這樣。

    但是，正如一位政策制定者最近對(duì)我提到的，多數(shù)幸存下來(lái)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)都有著一個(gè)顯著的特點(diǎn)，那就是：“他們往往是愛(ài)管閑事的人——非常事必躬親”。

    此外，很多人還有著另外一個(gè)關(guān)鍵特點(diǎn)：他們?cè)诮灰准肮芾硎袌?chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)方面都有著直接的工作經(jīng)驗(yàn)。這賦予了他們一個(gè)明顯的優(yōu)勢(shì)，以度過(guò)這次信貸周期，因?yàn)樗麄儜?yīng)該知道衍生品是一個(gè)什么東西。

    此外，高盛的勞埃德•布蘭克費(fèi)恩(Lloyd Blankfein)及德意志銀行的安蘇•賈殷(Anshu Jain)等人都是從交易部門(mén)晉升上來(lái)的，他們本能地會(huì)從概率與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的角度看待一切事物。和那些曾是銷(xiāo)售、顧問(wèn)或是律師（如普林斯）的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)相比，他們的思維方式是完全不同的。

    但是，還有第三個(gè)因素，甚至可能比上述因素更重要——權(quán)力文化。連局外人都看得出來(lái)，高盛顯然保留了從前合伙制的很多文化特征。雇員通常將自己看成是企業(yè)的伙伴，而不是公司掙錢(qián)的機(jī)器，而且，這里有一種很強(qiáng)烈的責(zé)任共擔(dān)風(fēng)氣。因而，與其它銀行相比，高盛的高層員工在審視其它業(yè)務(wù)部門(mén)的運(yùn)作方面似乎有著更多的自由。

    然而，花旗或美林等其它集團(tuán)似乎發(fā)展了一種等級(jí)更為分明的制度，不同業(yè)務(wù)分支仿佛像是正在交戰(zhàn)的部落，只服從最高首領(lǐng)一個(gè)人。而且，獲利最為豐厚的部落總是持有最大的權(quán)力——因而誰(shuí)也不能碰，也不受他人檢查。因此，在這樣一個(gè)部落文化中，沒(méi)有人去控制花旗與美林結(jié)構(gòu)性金融部門(mén)的肆無(wú)忌憚。

    現(xiàn)在，我完全可以想像，我的電子郵箱明天將會(huì)擠滿來(lái)自銀行人士的電郵，抱怨這三點(diǎn)將問(wèn)題過(guò)于簡(jiǎn)單化了。這是毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)的。但是，有一點(diǎn)很明顯，如果你想要判斷哪個(gè)銀行將從目前混亂的局面中勝出，僅僅了解銀行的計(jì)算機(jī)系統(tǒng)與資產(chǎn)負(fù)債狀況已經(jīng)不夠了�，F(xiàn)在，投資者比以往任何時(shí)候都更需要理解一家銀行的文化，以及它在多大程度上是一個(gè)部落。如我所言，在塔吉克斯坦人類(lèi)學(xué)方面的知識(shí)突然變得非常有用了。