So far, the international economic consequences of the war in the Caucasus have been fairly minor, despite Georgia's role as a major corridor for oil shipments. But as I was reading the latest bad news, I found myself wondering whether this war is an omen - a sign that the second great age of globalization may share the fate of the first.

    If you're wondering what I'm talking about, here's what you need to know: our grandfathers lived in a world of largely self-sufficient, inward-looking national economies - but our great-great grandfathers lived, as we do, in a world of large-scale international trade and investment, a world destroyed by nationalism.

    Writing in 1919, the great British economist John Maynard Keynes described the world economy as it was on the eve of World War I. "The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth … he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world."

    And Keynes's Londoner "regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement … The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion … appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalization of which was nearly complete in practice."

    But then came three decades of war, revolution, political instability, depression and more war. By the end of World War II, the world was fragmented economically as well as politically. And it took a couple of generations to put it back together.

    So, can things fall apart again? Yes, they can.

    Consider how things have played out in the current food crisis. For years we were told that self-sufficiency was an outmoded concept, and that it was safe to rely on world markets for food supplies. But when the prices of wheat, rice and corn soared, Keynes's "projects and politics" of "restrictions and exclusion" made a comeback: many governments rushed to protect domestic consumers by banning or limiting exports, leaving food-importing countries in dire straits.

    And now comes "militarism and imperialism." By itself, as I said, the war in Georgia isn't that big a deal economically. But it does mark the end of the Pax Americana - the era in which the United States more or less maintained a monopoly on the use of military force. And that raises some real questions about the future of globalization.

    Most obviously, Europe's dependence on Russian energy, especially natural gas, now looks very dangerous - more dangerous, arguably, than its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. After all, Russia has already used gas as a weapon: in 2006, it cut off supplies to Ukraine amid a dispute over prices.

    And if Russia is willing and able to use force to assert control over its self-declared sphere of influence, won't others do the same? Just think about the global economic disruption that would follow if China - which is about to surpass the United States as the world's largest manufacturing nation - were to forcibly assert its claim to Taiwan.

    Some analysts tell us not to worry: global economic integration itself protects us against war, they argue, because successful trading economies won't risk their prosperity by engaging in military adventurism. But this, too, raises unpleasant historical memories.

    Shortly before World War I another British author, Norman Angell, published a famous book titled "The Great Illusion," in which he argued that war had become obsolete, that in the modern industrial era even military victors lose far more than they gain. He was right - but wars kept happening anyway.

    So are the foundations of the second global economy any more solid than those of the first? In some ways, yes. For example, war among the nations of Western Europe really does seem inconceivable now, not so much because of economic ties as because of shared democratic values.

    Much of the world, however, including nations that play a key role in the global economy, doesn't share those values. Most of us have proceeded on the belief that, at least as far as economics goes, this doesn't matter - that we can count on world trade continuing to flow freely simply because it's so profitable. But that's not a safe assumption.

    Angell was right to describe the belief that conquest pays as a great illusion. But the belief that economic rationality always prevents war is an equally great illusion. And today's high degree of global economic interdependence, which can be sustained only if all major governments act sensibly, is more fragile than we imagine.

    盡管格魯吉亞是石油傳輸?shù)闹匾�通道，到目前為止，高加索地區(qū)戰(zhàn)爭對(duì)國際經(jīng)濟(jì)所產(chǎn)生的影響還比較小。但是，當(dāng)閱讀到最近一系列令人不安的新聞時(shí)，我陷入思考：這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭是否是一個(gè)先兆？全球化的第二個(gè)時(shí)代有可能會(huì)重蹈它上一個(gè)時(shí)代的覆轍。

    如果你不清楚我這種說法的依據(jù)，那你必須得先了解：我們的父輩生活在基本自給自足、并依靠內(nèi)部驅(qū)動(dòng)的國民經(jīng)濟(jì)世界中；而我們，卻生活在一個(gè)擁有巨大國際貿(mào)易和投資量，并且被民族主義破壞的世界中。

    偉大的英國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家約翰凱恩斯在1919年寫到，在第一次世界大戰(zhàn)臨近結(jié)束時(shí)，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)將會(huì)是這樣的，"倫敦的某個(gè)居民能夠一邊在床上喝著早茶，一邊用電話從世界的任何角落預(yù)訂產(chǎn)品 … 用同樣的方法，他同時(shí)還可以用自己的財(cái)富，在世界任何地方的自然資源和新企業(yè)中賭一把。"

    凱恩斯筆下的倫敦人"認(rèn)為，這樣的狀態(tài)除非更進(jìn)一步，否則將會(huì)是永遠(yuǎn)正常而且理所當(dāng)然的 … 軍國主義和帝國主義、種族和文化對(duì)抗、壟斷、管制以及排外所引發(fā)的計(jì)劃和政治 … 似乎對(duì)社會(huì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)生活的一般程序沒有任何影響，而國際化幾乎到達(dá)了全部完成的階段。"

    然而，此后出現(xiàn)了三十年的戰(zhàn)爭、革命、政治動(dòng)蕩、蕭條和更多的戰(zhàn)爭。當(dāng)?shù)诙�次世界大�?zhàn)結(jié)束時(shí)，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治一片支離破碎，通過之后幾代人的努力才將它們重新整合起來。

    所以，現(xiàn)在的事物還會(huì)變得支離破碎嗎？回答是肯定的。

    讓我們來看看目前的糧食危機(jī)是如何作用的。多年以來，我們都被告知"自給自足"是一個(gè)過時(shí)的說法，依賴國際市場(chǎng)獲取供應(yīng)是安全的。然而，當(dāng)小麥、大米和玉米的價(jià)格節(jié)節(jié)高升時(shí)，凱恩斯所說的"管制和排外"的"計(jì)劃和政治"卷土重來：許多政府急忙通過禁止或者限制出口來保護(hù)國內(nèi)消費(fèi)者，也使糧食依賴進(jìn)口的國家陷入困境。

    再來看看"軍國主義和帝國主義".正如我之前提到的，格魯吉亞的戰(zhàn)爭單獨(dú)看來，似乎對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)沒有什么大的影響，但它卻標(biāo)志著"美國統(tǒng)治下的秩序"時(shí)代的完結(jié) - 這個(gè)時(shí)代期間，美國或多或少地壟斷了軍事武力的使用。這也對(duì)全球化的未來提出了諸多真正的問題。

    最明顯的是，歐洲對(duì)俄羅斯能源，尤其是天然氣的依賴，現(xiàn)在看起來是非常危險(xiǎn)的 - 可以證明，這種危險(xiǎn)程度比它對(duì)中東石油的依賴更加嚴(yán)重。畢竟，俄羅斯已經(jīng)把天然氣用作武器，在2006年，他們?cè)谂c烏克蘭發(fā)生的天然氣價(jià)格爭端過程中停止了輸送。

    另外，如果俄羅斯愿意并且能夠使用武力控制其宣稱的勢(shì)力范圍，難道其它國家不也會(huì)這樣做嗎？試想，如果快要超過美國成為世界第一大生產(chǎn)國的中國，動(dòng)用武力宣告收復(fù)臺(tái)灣，后果將會(huì)怎樣？

    有些分析家勸告我們不用擔(dān)心，因?yàn)槭澜缃?jīng)濟(jì)的一體化能夠避免戰(zhàn)爭出現(xiàn)，他們認(rèn)為，成功的貿(mào)易經(jīng)濟(jì)體不會(huì)冒著失去財(cái)富的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，介入軍事冒險(xiǎn)主義。但是歷史同樣在這個(gè)問題上也給了我們不愉快的教訓(xùn)。

    第一次世界大戰(zhàn)開始前不久，另一位英國作家諾曼安吉爾出版了一本著名的書，名叫"巨大的假象",該書認(rèn)為戰(zhàn)爭已經(jīng)過時(shí)，因?yàn)樵诠�業(yè)化時(shí)代，即使獲得軍事勝利，結(jié)果都會(huì)是失大于得。他想法似乎有道理，可在此之后戰(zhàn)爭就沒有停止過。

    而第二輪經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的基礎(chǔ)是不是比第一次更加牢固？在某些方面，答案是肯定的。例如，西歐國家之間發(fā)生戰(zhàn)爭的可能性簡直無法想象，這不是因?yàn)樗鼈冎�間的經(jīng)濟(jì)紐帶，而是基于共同的民主價(jià)值觀。

    然而，世界的某些其它地區(qū)，包括在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中扮演重要角色的一些國家，并不認(rèn)同這樣的價(jià)值觀。我們多數(shù)人都有著這樣的信念，至少在經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域，將不會(huì)有太大的問題，因?yàn)槔麧櫨薮螅�全球貿(mào)易將繼續(xù)自由發(fā)展。可是，這并不是一個(gè)安全的假設(shè)。

    安吉爾是正確的，他認(rèn)為軍事勝利能夠幫助獲取利益是一個(gè)巨大的假象。同樣的，經(jīng)濟(jì)理性總能夠避免戰(zhàn)爭也是一個(gè)巨大的假象。今天世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的相互依賴程度的脆弱性遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超乎我們的想象，只有主要國家政府采取明智的措施，這種相互依賴才能夠得以維持。